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October 3, 2003 
The May 12, 2003 attacks in Riyadh on Western housing compounds and the ensuing summer-long 
series of anti-terrorist operations mounted by the Saudis against Al Qaeda leave no doubt about the 
intent of the Saudi government to seriously address its terrorist problem. The May 12 attacks constituted 
a wake-up call to the House of Saud, just as the September 11th attacks awakened the United States to 
the global nature of threat posed by Al Qaeda. The extent of the Al Qaeda network in the Kingdom, which 
apparently exists throughout the country from Riyadh to Medina to Qasim and the Eastern Provinces, 
serves as a reminder that Al Qaeda continues to pursue a core mission as articulated by Osama bin 
Laden: to destabilize the Kingdom and remove the House of Saud from power. If Iraq now constitutes the 
"central front" in the global war on terror[1], then the Kingdom itself must be regarded as one of the 
related and important geographic theaters in that war.  
 
The seizures of material by Saudi authorities have been truly staggering: underground storage facilities 
containing bags filled with over 20 tons of chemicals used for explosives; 72 kilograms of the explosive 
material RDX along with fuses and igniters; caches of small arms, machine guns and rocket propelled 
grenade launchers; night-vision goggles, communication devices and lap top computers; cash as well as 
motorbikes and cars ready for use in executing terrorist attacks. Hardly a week goes by in the Kingdom 
without a new report of a foiled operation and an exchange of gunfire. Since May 2003, Saudi Arabia has 
arrested more than 140 individuals with suspected ties to terrorism and large numbers of Saudi 
policemen have been killed in anti-terrorist operations. This is in addition to more than 300 arrests of 
terrorist suspects since September 11, 2001. The now-frequent press reports of government roadblocks 
and shootouts throughout the Kingdom bespeak a dramatically altered internal security environment. 
While press reports indicate that the movie "Battle of Algiers" is being shown in various Pentagon offices 
to highlight the difficulties of fighting an entrenched insurgency in the region, an actual battle of sorts is 
happening in real time in the Kingdom. The world has to hope that Saudi Arabia does not turn into a 
"Battle of Algiers." 
 Ongoing operations against Al Qaeda in the 
Kingdom have attracted sporadic media 
attention in the West, but it is by any measure 
an extremely active and intense theater in the 
fight against al Qaeda. Shown at left are 
bloodstains as seen on the stairs of a three-
story housing complex of the King Fahd 
Hospital in Jizan, 960 kms (600 miles) south 
from the capital Riyadh, in Saudi Arabia, 
Wednesday, Sept. 24, 2003. Three suspected 
militants and a policeman were killed in a 
shootout between Saudi police and militants 
who were hiding in an apartment. One of 
those killed in the raid was Zubayr Al-Rimi, 
one of four men with alleged links to al-
Qaeida listed in a special FBI bulletin issued 
just before the second anniversary of the 
Sept. 11 attacks. His father reportedly 
identified Al Rimi's body.  
The Politics of Reform and Terror 
The fight against Al Qaeda comes as the Royal family is engaged in delicate negotiations with a variety of 
different stakeholders inside the Kingdom to determine the nature and pace of internal political and 
economic reform. Petitioners pushing a reform agenda met with Crown Prince Abdullah in January 2003 
in a meeting that was widely publicized, and a copy of the petition was released to the press.[2] The fact 
that Abdullah met with the petitioners at all reflects his recognition that the reform issue will not go away 
and must receive attention at the highest levels of government. The petitioners called for a constitutional 
system of government with an elected legislature, an empowered and separate judiciary and an 
acknowledgment by the government of a variety of different rights—free speech, freedom to form 
associations as well as a commitment to address an expanded role for women in Saudi society. While 
attention within the Kingdom has undoubtedly been diverted by the internal security situation over the last 
several months, the issue of reform remains very much in play. To be sure, the war on terror in the 
Kingdom represents another complicating factor in this process. One can imagine that the last thing 
Crown Prince Abdullah wanted to see in the midst of rolling up militant cells was another public call for 
political, economic and social change. But the reformers would not wait. 
The latest reform petition, delivered to Crown Prince Abdullah on September 24, 2003, is titled "In 
Defense of the Nation."[3] The petitioners signaled their support for the government's fight against Al 
Qaeda by stating unequivocally that "…expressing refusal and condemnation to all kinds of extremism 
and violence becomes a national, political, moral and cultural necessity." At the same time, however, the 
petitioners note that "…we are all invited to take our responsibility and review our steps and admit that 
being late in adopting radical reforms and ignoring popular participation in decision-making have been the 
main reasons that helped the fact that our country reached this dangerous turn, and this is why we 
believe that denying the natural rights of the political, cultural and intellectual society to express its 
opinions has led to the dominance of a certain way of thinking that is unable to dialogue with others 
because of its inherent structure, and which does not reflect the greatness of Islam nor does it reflect 
enlightened trends, which is what helped create the terrorist and judgmental mind that our country is still 
plagued with." 
The petitioners further state that "confronting terrorism can only be done through security means and 
solutions, but with a thorough diagnosis of the political, social and economical and cultural factors that 
have led to it, and by starting to implement political and economic reforms, developed through many 
suggestions, opinions and demands" that have already been submitted to the royal family (i.e., the 
January petition). Significantly, the petitioners signal their growing impatience at the pace of reform and 
reiterate previous calls (again from the January petition) to eliminate corruption and to end the 
"mismanagement" of public funds, redistribute national wealth more equitably, ensure that women play a 
more prominent role in political and economic issues, and call for the government to address the pressing 
social needs of poverty, housing and health care. In sum, the petition throws down a gauntlet before the 
House of Saud. 
Crown Prince Abdullah: A High Wire Act 
The complexities of the Saudi domestic political environment and the challenges facing Abdullah cannot 
be underestimated as he mobilizes the fight against Al Qaeda while simultaneously preserving consensus 
within the royal family and negotiating among the important players on the political landscape to nudge 
the Kingdom towards meaningful reform. Not surprisingly, the stakeholders in this process do not share 
common objectives, though there is overlap among several of the groups.  
• House of Saud. The royal family is reportedly divided on the pace and direction of reform. Interior 
Minister Prince Naef and Defense Minister Prince Sultan (Sudairi brothers) are rumored to 
oppose moving quickly to implement reforms. Crown Prince Abdullah is said to be sympathetic to 
the reformers, but lacks the authority as acting regent to impose his will on the rest of the royal 
family. And, even if King Fahd was to pass away and make Abdullah king, it is unclear that 
Abdullah would have enough broadly based support within the family to move as quickly and 
dramatically as the reformers want. Operations against the terrorists complicate the intra-family 
dynamics, with Interior Minister Naef taking a leading role in this fight. While the family arguably 
should be united against Al Qaeda, which aims to bring down the House of Saud, rumors persist 
of royal family financial support for the organization. Further, Abdullah must carefully weigh the 
political tradeoffs of ensuring Naef's continued aggressive pursuit of Al Qaeda while continuing to 
signal support for a reform agenda opposed by powerful elements within the family (said to 
include Naef). 
 
The reform agenda also confronts powerful institutional interests within the ruling family 
developed through the family's widespread dispersal throughout government ministries. Here, the 
central issue of corruption and the potential of a truly independent and empowered judiciary 
represents a profound source of opposition to reform within the royal family. While there are no 
"public" finances per se (as referenced in the latest petition), it is no secret that a certain 
percentage of proceeds from oil sales are disbursed throughout the royal family to support their 
opulent lifestyle. And this is separate and distinct from the well-known royal family practice of 
using their positions in government ministries to steer contracts to suit their own ends—and 
bottom line. An end to corruption and a redistribution of wealth—as called for in the petition—
holds forth the prospect of the royal family losing its privileged socio-economic status within the 
Kingdom and even worse (from the perspective of the royal family) that the family could be held 
accountable for past crimes by an independent judiciary. Having said this, however, there are 
certain elements within the family, said to be led by Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal, who 
recognize that reform is inevitable and that the ruling family should try to preserve its position by 
managing and controlling the reform process. Abdullah must manage these different factions and 
preserve consensus to avoid an open break within the family. 
• The religious establishment. The Nejd religious establishment, in partnership with the House of 
Saud since the inception of the state, constitutes another central player in the political landscape. 
This establishment is directly supported by the state, and their fate is tied to that of the royal 
family. In terms of the war on terror in the Kingdom, the House of Saud cannot choke off terrorist 
funding within the Kingdom without the support of the religious establishment due to the latter's 
control over mosque activities. The religious establishment, however, is facing its own problems 
in exerting more control in the mosques due to an emerging caste of "dissident" clerics who are 
calling for a return to the country's Islamic roots while preaching an anti-American, anti-Western 
message in mosques around the country. It remains unclear the degree to which these clerics are 
leading or following public opinion in the Kingdom—opinion which is shown to be anti-United 
States in a number of recent polls. While the reformers on the one hand are asserting the need 
for an Islamic state administered according to Islamic law (the Sharia), the prospect of a truly 
independent and empowered judiciary potentially threatens the primacy of the religious 
establishment writ large and their omnipresent role in the country's legal system. Moreover, the 
religious establishment's control over the country's educational system potentially could be 
threatened if constitutional reforms are implemented. Last, the religious establishment remains 
uninterested in supporting any agenda that expands women's rights. 
 
Sheikh Safr al Hawali is a leading "dissident" cleric in the Kingdom that 
was jailed by the government for his activities in the early 1990s. Now 
released from jail, he is regarded as one of a new group of younger 
clerics that is challenging the religious establishment and, by extension, 
the royal family. The fiery sermons of Hawali are widely available 
throughout the Kingdom on cassette tapes. He has also written a "open 
letter to President Bush" expressing some of the same themes seen in 
bin Laden's fatwas. 
• Merchant families of the Hijaz and Riyadh. These powerful players on the Saudi political 
landscape have much to gain and lose in the reform process. The prospect of opening up the 
country's economy promises to place them in an even more ascendant position as the "new 
captains" of the Saudi economy. On the other hand, the prospect of real and genuine competition 
in a transparent system operating in accordance with standard practices of the global economy 
threatens to put some of them out of business. For this group (to the extent they can be lumped 
together), the apparently stalled effort to gain entry in the World Trade Organization (WTO) is a 
critical issue. These families are said to have demanded an end to corruption as the price for their 
support for Abdullah's efforts to join the WTO. Abdullah cannot honor these terms to the letter—
since it means addressing corruption within his own extended family. The House of Saud also 
needs the support of these merchant families in the battle against the Al Qaeda, since this groups 
represent another potential source of financial and political support for the militant groups. While 
the families of the Hejaz and Riyadh have had historic ties to the House of Saud it is also fair to 
say that prudence would demand that the families hedge their bets on reform. This is another 
important constituency that needs to be addressed by Abdullah. 
• The "Reformers". It is impossible to know the depth and breadth of support for the petitioners. As 
a group, their demands for a constitutional governmental system that addresses the issue of 
women's rights places them on the left side of the conservative Saudi political spectrum and at 
odds with the religious establishment. And, loudly proclaiming their demand for an end to 
corruption places them on a collision course with powerful elements within the House of Saud. 
What to do about this group presents a political conundrum for the United States and the West in 
general. The petitioners clearly support a series of ideas consistent with the Bush 
Administration's views on creating fundamentally new economic and political systems throughout 
the region. However, any expression of support by the United States or other countries for these 
ideas might only serve to de-legitimize the group given the pervasive anti-American sentiment 
within the Kingdom.[4] While it is unclear what direct influence this group can bring to bear on 
Abdullah, the group's continued public demands for a more "modern" system of governance will 
inevitably attract international attention, which in and of itself will represent an indirect pressure 
on the royal family to acknowledge the necessity of reforms. The petitioners have everything to 
lose in the fight against Al Qaeda. On the one hand, they see that the regime will use the internal 
security situation as a defensible excuse to delay reforms. On the other, the Taliban-like state that 
would ensue if the militants won would not be a healthy environment for professionals, educators 
and technocrats. 
• The Silent Majority. As a still largely opaque society, it is impossible to definitively gauge the 
attitudes of the 18 million Saudi nationals toward political and economic reform and the 
government's battle against the militants. It is equally impossible to know the extent of Osama bin 
Laden's support within the Kingdom and whether that support extends to Al Qaeda's objective of 
fundamentally changing the country's internal politics. To the extent that a "silent majority" can be 
identified, it is this group—the wider Saudi populace—that holds the key to the Kingdom's 
economic and political future. While Abdullah must carefully navigate around and through (if 
necessary) the powerful interest groups identified above, it is the attitudes of the Saudi people 
themselves that will determine how far Abdullah and successive leaders can push the Kingdom 
down a reform path while simultaneously fighting a war against terrorists.  
Conclusion 
The battle on terror within the Kingdom thus becomes inextricably intertwined with forces on the domestic 
political landscape maneuvering to address political and economic reform. Crown Prince Abdullah will 
need a mixture of toughness, subtlety and deft skill to successfully navigate through these treacherous 
waters while at the same time dealing with a surprisingly well-established militant infrastructure. If there 
was ever a "deal" between the royal family and bin Laden that provided him with financial support in 
exchange for not directly attacking the Kingdom, that deal clearly is now over and the battle is joined. It 
remains to be seen whether the Kingdom can address both terrorism and reform at once, but it seems 
clear that failure to successfully manage both issues will have dire consequences for the Kingdom's future. 
And, the future of Kingdom should be of interest to the global community of nations. With the world's 
dependence on oil expected to grow by 40 percent over the next 20 years, we can expect events inside 
the Kingdom during this critical period to resonate around the globe.  
 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our Middle East and Homeland Security and Terrorism Resources. 
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